'The government evidently hasn't the stomach to have him fired by his commander-in-chief, the acting president. It fears nasty repercussions if it tried to. Can Commodore Bainimarama's position now be accurately described as Napoleonic?'


In January, the hub of the South Pacific became a very unsettled place. People-citizens, expatriate residents, investors, diplomats and their governments and international agencies--were wondering who was really in control of the country, the elected government or the army?

On January 16, there was justification for deciding that an army coup being more than hinted at by the army commander, Frank Bainimarama, had actually taken place. The country was being run by the army from behind the scenes. On stage were the puppets.

Before then, Mr Bainimarama, who for several years has made no secret of the dim view he has of the Fijian nationalist-dominated elected government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, has clearly inferred that the army was prepared to take power from the government.

Legal and other sources were privately in some instances and publicly in others interpreted Mr Bainimarama's remarks as being treasonable and, at the least, seditious. He had repeatedly demanded the resignation of what he condemned as allegedly a corrupt and racist government-and all the while protesting that national security was assured and that citizens needn't worry or panic. He had said that the army was prepared to complete or resume the job it did after a May 2000 coup by civilian-led militants against the then elected government.

What it did was form a brief military government, negotiate the freedom of government ministers and politicians taken hostage by the militants, and then transfer power to an interim government composed of indigenous Fijians, led by Laisenia Qarase, a then rather obscure bureaucrat.

There is a view that Mr Bainimarama in fact surreptitiously completed the coup since the object of it-the replacement of the country's first Indian-led government by an indigenous regime-was achieved.

In 2001, a democratic election turned Mr Qarase into a full-time politician and confirmed his new role as prime minister.

Since his government was dominated very conspicuously by Fijian nationalist sympathisers with just one sympathetic Indian minister, the objective of the May 2000 event remain satisfied.

The army commander became a figure generally held in great public esteem. The perception was that he was the ultimate protector of democracy.

Mr Bainimarama had, and has, many admirers. They view him as an honourable man, a cut way above grasping opportunists who had, or were still, exploiting Fijian nationalism for their own dubious financial and political ends.

Some time after 2001 relations between the army commander and Mr Qarase and certain of his lieutenants began to deteriorate.

A sequel to the May coup was a barrack mutiny in November 2000 which had the objective of killing Mr Bainimarama and the installation apparently of an extremist Fijian regime. Eight soldiers died and Mr Bainimarama had a narrow escape.

The mutiny enraged him. He remains enraged and intent on hunting down and punishing everyone who was a party to it.

He began openly challenging the government, accusing it of going soft on the identification and prosecution of coup plotters and leniently treating the few major figures caught, convicted and jailed, including the country's former vice-president and important figures in the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua, a party greatly sympathetic to the coup and vital to the security of Mr Qarase's coalition government.

Mr Bainimarama's distrust and disdain of the Qarase government intensified when in 2005 the government published a bill for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. Most of the bill's objectives are praiseworthy. However, a section that offered the opportunity of pardons for coup convicts and suspects appalled not merely Mr Bainimarama but the Fiji Law Society, the country's Australian police commissioner, opposition parties and some foreign governments and international civil rights agencies.

It was attacked as being gross interference with the independence of the judiciary, police, public prosecutor's office and the preservation of law and order from future assault by coup plotters.

The Qarase government climbed down. Some offending sections will be removed or amended. But in late January, it was not known how or whether the offending amnesty section would be amended.

The government wants to get the bill through parliament in February so that a reconciliation commission can be appointed and get to work. The government has obvious motives for the amnesty provision to be worked out before a general election, due later this year.

Mr Qarase needs to firm up support of the extreme wing of nationalism if he is to remain in power.

The prospect of an early freedom or immunity from prosecution would secure that support.

Mr Bainimarama has very clearly stated that the army will block the bill by any means.

As the crisis between the army and government deepened in January, no reasonable person could interpret the army commander's utterances despite his denials and assurances, as being anything less than a threat of the imposition of a military government.

In any other democratic country, and Fiji is (or was) basically one, Mr Bainimarama's stance would have promptly caused his dismissal. It has soared far beyond the democratic convention that the military is subservient to the policies of a proper civilian rule.

Fiji's constitution makes the country's president also commander-in-chief of the military. By convention he is expected to accept the advice of the government concerning the appointment and replacement of the army commander.

There is little doubt that the government dearly wants Mr Bainimarama sacked. It appears the ageing and ailing president, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, whose appointment will expire in March, has been Mr Bainimarama's man. Many critics of the Qarase government are relieved that he is.

In January, as the plot and counter-plots thickened, the role of acting president was assumed by vice-president Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, a person of high Fijian traditional rank and of great integrity and intelligence.

His arrival, a somewhat unwilling one, in such a vital place at a time of such stress was a happy event for the country, if not for him personally.

In mid-January, a confident and assertive army commander had the upper hand over the Qarase government. The government passed the buck to the acting president who on January 16 mediated between it and the army commander.

Constitutionally, as commander-in-chief, Madraiwiwi who some months before had expressed disquiet about the army's attitude is empowered to dismiss Mr Bainimarama, although presumably only on the advice of the government through the home affairs and army minister.

Mr Bainimarama left the meeting triumphant. The government capitulated to him on every point. In essence, he agreed not to criticise the government without first telling it his views.

A statement issued by the acting president in the afternoon said the army chief had “agreed to forebear further comment in the media without first communicating his views to the government. In that regard, it is critical that elements in government and the military exercise circumspection and discretion in their dealings with each other at all times”.

Regular channels of communication between the government and the army would be “re-established.”

The statement shows that Qarase made several concessions to Bainimarama who had complained that among other faults, the government had failed to properly liaised with him on security and military matters.

Bainimarama and police commissioner Andrew Hughes, a former Australian Federal police officer, will be invited to attend meetings of the National Security Council. The council is composed of Qarase and several other key cabinet ministers as observers.

Qarase agreed to “address” army concerns about the reconciliation, tolerance and unity bill, a bill for creating ethnic Fijian courts separate from the mainstream judicial system; and a bill for the transfer of ownership of beaches, lagoons, reefs and marine resources to coastal Fijian villages which have traditional rights to their usage.

Army complaints about deficiencies in the registration of electors for a general election due later this year will be raised with the electoral commission and elections supervisor.

The army, Fiji Law Society and other influential critics attacked the reconciliation bill as being a device to enable 2000 convicted coup conspirators and remaining suspects to obtain pardons.

The bill about fishing and other marine rights has alarmed beach resort owners and other beachfront developers who said they would be hit with heavy demands for payments from indigenous owners of lagoons transferred from the state to their control.

Not mentioned in the statement was that Bainimarama won another important concession.
This is that the acting president agreed to refer to the Public Service Commission the position of Dr Lesi Korovavala as chief executive officer at the home affairs ministry.

Bainimarama had publicly demanded Korovavala's sacking for allegedly being involved in attempts to have him removed from office. Korovavala flatly denied the allegation that Fiji's army chief isn't entirely secure. He is usually accompanied by several armed bodyguards.

The government evidently hasn't the stomach to have him fired by his commander-in-chief, the acting president. It fears nasty repercussions if it tried to. Can Commodore Bainimarama's position now be accurately described as Napoleonic?