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Satish Chand
It is some five months since the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) ousted their constitutionally elected government on December 5, 2006. This was the fourth coup in 19 years, the international community was aghast at the usurping of power by the RFMF yet again in Fiji. Australia and New Zealand placed travel bans on everyone associated with the coup, and the EU and the United States suspended their support to the RFMF.
The conundrum for the international community, however, is what to do next. The military regime has survived five months in office, the ousted regime is slipping into obscurity and the economic fallout from further isolation of the administration would only hurt the poor of Fiji. The heightened international security environment following 911 and the recent breakdown in law and order in the surrounding region including Dili, Honiara, and Nukualofa, all point to the need for utmost care in cajoling Fiji back to the path of democratic rule. Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, is in an extremely awkward position. He sent in his navy to Fiji, supposedly to rescue Australian citizens caught up in the coup, the need for which never arose. Australians in Fiji have never been harmed in past coups and this coup was no different as far as they were concerned.
By sending the navy, Australia soured its relationship with the Fiji military. Many in Fiji read the posturing by Australia, including the flexing of the military muscle, as signalling to Commodore Bainimarama to remain within his barracks and the assigned role as per the Constitution.
This proved not to be a credible threat, as revealed later. To make matters worse, two innocent Australian lives were lost in a tragic accident on one of the ships.
It is no secret that Qarase and Howard were good mates, that the two had been exchanging views on the pre-coup developments in Fiji, and that both had joined forces on pushing for a number of issues on the regional front. Howard had entertained Qarase at a lavish lunch at the Great Hall of the Australian Federal Parliament only a month before the coup, boasting then of the close relationships between and common agendas of the two nations. Not surprisingly, Qarase, when surrounded by his own soldiers at his official residence at the overthrow of his government called on his Canberra mate for assistance and in what form remains in dispute, however. Howard reported to the Australian media that military assistance was asked for while Qarase denied making any such specific request.
The denial by Qarase is not surprising since doing so without the accent of Parliament would have amounted to treason.
The denial of military assistance by PM Howard is not surprising either. But his decision to go public with the request after refusing it, knowing fully well of the consequences for his erstwhile ‘mate’, is most perplexing.
To many, the last coup was anything but a surprise. It may thus be worth considering what more could have been done to avert what some now call the inevitable.
New Zealand attempted to broker a last minute truce between Qarase and the Commodore and is still smarting from its failure to achieve reconciliation between the two.
The more urgent consideration is what may be done to assist Fiji back to normality but without encouraging another coup.
The international community has to learn to work with the regime in place in Fiji if they are to help in an orderly and speedy return to democratic rule.
There are simply no other alternatives. This has to include some careful thinking on what must be done to get Fiji off its cycle of coups.
Ex-ante, it makes complete sense for the international community to do everything possible to avert a coup, but being vindictive ex-post does not make much sense.
Australia was reported to have campaigned for the suspension of Fiji’s membership of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) while New Zealand is reported to have done the same with regards to the employment of Fiji soldiers as peacekeepers with the United Nations.
New Zealand, moreover, suspended access to its guest worker scheme from Fiji following the coup. It is time to bring such actions to an end if progress is to have a chance.
Relations between Fiji on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) on the other have begun to thaw, for which much credit goes to the Melanesians who quickly banded around Fiji to neutralise the threats from Australia and New Zealand.
The interim regime in Fiji has agreed to consider the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group and subsequently endorsed by the Foreign Ministers at their last meeting held in Port Vila.
Australia, New Zealand, and the US should, as a start, begin lifting their travel bans on those judged to be ‘guilty by association’ with the coup plotters.
Many families in Fiji were divided and some remain on less than talking terms on the role of their kin in the coup but are still being penalised by Australia, New Zealand and the US authorities simply because they are related to someone linked to the coup. It is time for some maturity on this issue.
Europe has done better in keeping an open dialogue during this crisis. Credit to the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, it has an inbuilt mechanism to handle eventualities of the nature faced in post-coup Fiji.
Of particular relevance to the Forum are those with respect to political dialogue (Article 8), good governance and protection of human rights (Article 9), and peace building and conflict prevention and resolution (Article 11).
These have been used to keep dialogue open between Fiji and the EU. It provides a model that could be built upon to create a more robust regional institutional infrastructure amongst the Forum members to handle similar future crises if they do eventuate.
Future coups have to be dissuaded. Human rights abuses of the nature alleged to have taken place in the aftermath of the last coup cannot be condoned.
Furthermore, constitutional rule is good for Fiji first, and others, second. Many of the concerns raised by Commodore Bainimarama were ignored by Qarase until the fate accompli.
The post coup era in Fiji since 1987 had seen some of the worst scandals ever, all undertaken in cahoots with those in power.
The National Bank of Fiji scam that cost taxpayers in excess of F$200 million, the agriculture scam that cost taxpayers another F$20 million, the release of prisoners convicted of treasonable offences, and the granting of public assets to consolidate political support have taken place under post-coup regimes.
The economy in the meantime stagnated and poverty continued its steady march forward: nearly one in three in the population was unable to afford the basic needs of life by 2002, a climb from a figure of one in four a decade earlier.
Maybe regional leaders could have leaned more heavily on their Fijian counterpart to stop the abuses early in its track and thus avert the last coup. Too late for the last coup, but lessons enough to weigh-down the next one. Peer review of individual performances at future Forum Leaders Meetings provides a means of institutionalising the above.
Dr Satish Chand is an academic at The Australian National University
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