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‘The region’s vastness, its resource richness, its proclivity for political instability, its weakness that can be exploited by transnational terrorist and crime organisations—all compounded by America’s long neglect in the region—have added to the urgency
After that flurry of flying visits by senior United States’ State Department officials to several key locations in the region last year (the Pacific Islands Forum meeting and post-Forum dialogue in Fiji) and all their talk of strengthening their relationships here (like asking for ‘New Zealand’s eyes to see the Pacific’), it is no surprise the world’s solo superpower has named this year, 2007, as ‘The Year of the Pacific’.
With its increasingly messy entanglements in Iraq and other parts of the world over the past several years, the Pacific—despite it being the largest single geographical and resource rich area on the globe—seemed to have receded into a mere blip on America’s political radar. Its involvement in the region except for the Northern Pacific, thanks to North Korea, has seemed desultory, particularly in its own tiny scattered territories.
The superpower has acknowledged that it has been spending a lot less time, effort and resources in the region than it should be, attributing it to policy priorities and budgetary constraints.
The perception of America’s invisibility in the Pacific has been further accentuated by the high profile wrangling for one-up manship in the region between China and Taiwan over the last few years, not to speak of the ubiquitous influence of Australia and New Zealand for decades.
Clearly, America is determined to change the world’s perception that it is a marginal player in the region. In an address delivered in Washington last month to tell the world about its firm intent to make a big splash in the world’s largest ocean, a senior official said the country wanted to reverse any perception that the United States had withdrawn from the Pacific region.
The region’s vastness, its resource richness, its proclivity for political instability, its weakness that can be exploited by transnational terrorist and crime organisations—all compounded by America’s long neglect in the region—have all added to the acute sense of urgency in taking proactive steps in the Pacific.
In lending the theme of the Year of the Pacific, the idea is to bring the importance it gives to the region into sharp focus within its policy-making machinery, as well as to get various government departments and agencies—including Defence, Coast Guard, Interior, the Peace Corps, among others—to work together to make the country’s presence felt in the region.
It is evident that it intends to make up for lost time. It has already started the ball rolling over the past year having created two new positions in its embassy in Suva to concentrate on various matters concerning the region and scouting for locations to set up outposts in countries like the Solomon Islands.
In a meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark at the White House last month, both President George Bush and Secretary of State Condolezza Rice reaffirmed their commitment to work with New Zealand in the Pacific region. Helen Clark reiterated her earlier request for increased United States interest in the region.
America stopped short of even hinting at a possible timeframe for a future Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand obviously given its long standing disagreements on nuclear issues and the Iraq War as was widely expected.
But the talks were overly positive as regards cooperation in the Pacific Islands region. Though New Zealand came back with a little more than a promise of continued friendship, the United States extracted its commitment of working with it in the Pacific.
And the United States means business: Next month, it will host a convention of Pacific Heads of State in Washington DC (though there is still doubt if Fiji’s Interim Prime Minister will be invited to attend). This is the first time such a meet will be held on the mainland. The administration hopes to use this opportunity to put Pacific leaders face to face with its gargantuan policy-making apparatus.
How will the ripples caused by America’s big Pacific splash affect the islands countries?
For one, increased awareness of the Pacific islands within the United States, the world’s largest single consumer market, will most certainly have a positive impact on tourist numbers from the North American continent.
More Americans than ever before will land on our islands shores. Cultural and handicraft exports from the islands will also register a rise.
There is a good chance the South Pacific will grow popular enough to become the flavour of the season. And that could quite easily whet the appetite for more television shows and film locales based in the islands for America’s ever-hungry entertainment industry. All that will hopefully help rake in the much-needed greenback for the severely depleted coffers of small islands economies.
As its engagement in the region gets deeper, islands countries will likely see more aid programmes as well as an increase in private American investments, particularly in the tourism infrastructure sector.
On the flip side, America’s rising profile in the region will force China and Taiwan to rethink their strategies that could bring in an element of tension at some future stage.
Other major players in the region like Japan, France and, of course, Australia and New Zealand would also be keenly interested in any developing scenarios.
Especially if and when America begins to moot the idea of moving its military inventory in the region (in the name of perceived global terrorist threats a la WMD or any other reason)—something it is more than likely to do going by its past record.
There is also the chance that increasing involvement in the region will result in it getting embroiled in islands nations’ domestic politics—to which there are far too many precedents.
It will be up to the islands’ leaders to find pragmatic ways of making the best use of the economic benefits that an association with a wealthy and powerful nation like the United States can bring while not succumbing to any quid pro quo arrangements that will end up compromising their all too fragile geopolitical profiles.
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